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4  The Process of  High Inflation 
In this chapter we investigate the economics of high and explosive inflation.’ 
We  develop a model  of  the main determinants  of  the  inflation  process  and 
make  the  point  that  explosive  inflation  arises  from  the  disintegration  or 
“melting”  of  several institutions.  Such  an  analysis  shows how  Argentina, 
from 1975 to 1980, went from about 100 percent inflation to a condition of 
near hyperinflation. The analysis also explains why successful stabilization is 
much less likely in the aftermath of a hyperinflation. 
Table  4.1  shows averages  of  monthly  inflation  rates  for  countries  that 
recently  undertook  stabilization-Israel  in  June  1985, Argentina  in  July 
1985,  Bolivia  and  Peru  in  August  1985, Brazil  in  February  1986,  and 
Mexico at the end of  1987. The table shows the stabilization following after 
double-digit (monthly) inflation  rates and then, except in Israel, the gradual 
return of high  inflation.  For Mexico the stabilization  is too recent to judge 
the longer run success. 
We  develop here a model of  the inflation process that highlights the roles 
of  budget finance,  tax  and financial institutions,  and contracts  in creating a 
high-inflation scenario.  The framework  not only identifies the determinants 
of inflation, but has as its principal objective to explain the mechanics of  the 
very  sharp  acceleration  that  occurred  on  several  occasions.  In  the  first 
Table 4.1  Recent High-Inflation Experiences (annual and quarterly averages of monthly 
inflation rates) 
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section we discuss the role of  the budget in the inflation process.  Then, we 
deal with the link among the real exchange rate, real wages, and inflation. In 
the third section we discuss the role of changing the frequency of contracting 
in  accelerating  inflation,  and  finally  conclude with  some remarks  on why 
stabilization is so difficult. 
4.1  Deficit Finance 
There is  considerable  controversy  in Argentina  about  the  exact or even 
approximate  size  of  budget  deficits.  Reliable  public  data,  covering  an 
extended  period  of  time  in  a comparable fashion, are simply  unavailable. 
Various series differ in their coverage of the public sector, in the distinction 
between budget and cash bases, and  in the inclusion of  certain expenditure 
items, especially with respect to the quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank. 
Table 4.2 shows four different  series for the  government  budget  deficit. 
There are only two comprehensive, long-run time series available. One was 
prepared  by  Cavallo  and  Pena  (1983), who measure  deficits  by  summing 
government  money  and  debt  financing.  For  the  period  since  1960, FIEL 
(1987)  has  put  together  detailed  public  sector  statistics.  Among  the 
attractions of  these  two series are the uniform  methodology  of  construction 
for a long time period and their comprehensiveness in measuring the entire 
operation of the public sector. 
We  also show a  series  for the  deficit  of  the  nonfinancial  public  sector 
published by the World Bank that is only available for the more recent years. 
This  latter  series  is  less  comprehensive in  that  it  does  not  include  the 
quasi-fiscal  deficit  from  Central  Bank  losses.  Finally,  we  report  the  cash 
basis deficit of  the nonfinancial public sector, including losses of the Central 
Bank, which is calculated by the Central Bank using IMF methodology.  It is 
apparent  that  where the series  overlap, they  show widely  diverging  deficit 
estimates. Moreover, these differences become more important in the  1980s 
Table 4.2  Alternative Measures of the Budget Deficit (as a percentage of GDP) 
IMFiBCRA  Period  Cavallo-Pena  FIEL  World Bank 
1960-64 
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when  losses  from  exchange  rate  guarantees,  for  example,  become  an 
important part of  government outlays. 
Table  4.3 shows  in  more  detail  the  Cavallo-Pena  measures.  The table 
illustrates  the  financing  of  the  deficit-internally  by  debt  and  money, 
and  by  external  debt.  The  table  also  shows  the  debt  service  component, 
which  includes  payments  related  to  exchange rate  guarantees  as  well  as 
indexation. 
4.1.1  Passive Money, Deficit Finance, and Inflation 
The most  common  view,  certainly  held  by  a group far more broad  than 
that  of  the  monetarists,  asserts that  high  inflation  is  the  result  of  budget 
deficits. If the government spends more than it receives in tax collection, the 
remainder is financed by creating money. That means more money, too much 
money, chasing too few goods, with the predictable outcome of inflation. 
This  view,  while  basically  correct, needs  considerable  refinement  to  be 
entirely correct.  Three kinds of  correction are essential.  First, there is some 
room  for  noninflationary  deficit  finance.  Second,  deficits  can  also  be 
financed  by  debt.  Third,  there  is  a  channel  of  causation  that  runs  from 
inflation  to  deficits,  as well  as  the  other way  around. In  this  section  we 
elaborate a model of these important qualifications. 
The  deficit  can  be  financed  in  one  of  three  ways:  with  high-powered 
money, with domestic debt, or with foreign debt. 
MIP  + BIP  + B*elP  = gY, 
Table 4.3  Cavallo-Rna Measures of  the Budget Deficit and Financing (as a percentage 
of  GDP) 
Financed  Financed  Debt  Deficit Excluding 
Period  Total  Internally  Externally  Service"  Debt  Service 
1940-44 































































































Source:  Cavallo and Pena (1983) and update kindly provided by  A. Pena. 
"Includes all payments related to debt, specifically exchange rate guarantees and indexation payments. 80  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
where g is the deficit ratio; Y is real GDP; M is the domestic base money; B 
and B*  are domestic and foreign debt; and e is the exchange rate (Austral/$). 
A dot over a variable denotes the rate of change. 
It  is  immediately  clear that  deficits  can  be  financed  by  borrowing  from 
abroad or at home, entirely avoiding an increase in the money stock, at least 
for the  time being.  But  it  is  important to stress the  “for  the  time being” 
qualification. As pointed out by  Dornbusch  (1978) and Sargent and Wallace 
(198  l), a shift away from money finance may well be inflationary because the 
buildup in the real value of  debt has no counterpart in extra taxation when the 
real interest rate exceeds the growth rate of output. Accordingly,  there must 
eventually be an inflationary liquidation of debt or else a sharp increase in the 
inflation tax. But for the present we will not look at debt finance. Instead we 
will focus on the situation in which the entire deficit is financed by money. We 
are interested in how much inflation is generated by such a system. 
InJarionary Finance 
Financing deficits by  money creation means that any money that is not in 
demand at  the  current  level  of  prices  must  be  forced  on  the  public  by 
inflation.  In a growing economy some extra real  balances  are demanded  in 
order to  finance  the  growing  level  of  transactions.  But  beyond  that,  the 
demand for nominal money  expands only to the extent that inflation erodes 
the purchasing power of existing real balances. To  restore their real balances 
(at least partially), the public has to add to nominal money holdings. Thus 
inflationary  finance  automatically  creates  a  demand  for  the  money  issue 
which finances the deficit. 
Keynes ([1923]  1971), in  his  splendid  description  of  the  inflation  tax, 
noted the potential for inflationary finance even in a country with the poorest 
economic and political conditions: 
So long  as the public  use money at all, the government  can continue to 
raise  resources  by  inflation.  . . , A  government can  get resources  by  a 
continuous practice of  inflation, even when  this is foreseen by the public 
generally, unless the sums they seek to raise in this way are very grossly 
excessive. . . . 
. . . What  is  raised  by  printing  notes  is just  as  much  taken  from the 
public as is a beer duty or an income tax. What a government spends the 
public pays for. There is no such thing as an uncovered deficit. (28-29) 
But, as Keynes has observed, the difficulty in this procedure of taxation is 
that  major inflation or high erosion of  the real  value of  money reduces  the 
amount of  money people choose to hold because they will substitute toward 
assets that are more inflation proof. Thus, just as high taxation erodes the tax 
base, high  inflation  leads to  a reduction  in  real  balances  and  hence  to an 
increase in the rate of inflation necessary to finance a given deficit. Moreover, 
there may be a maximum  amount of resources the government can extract. 81  ArgentindChapter 4 
In appendix B  we derive the relation between the budget deficit and the 
rate of inflation which results from financing that deficit by money creation. 
Equation (2)  (which is derived in the appendix) shows this long-run relation 
between deficits and inflation: 
(2) 
where  T and y  are the  rate  of  inflation  and  the  growth  rate  of  real  GDP, 
respectively.  The term a  represents the noninflationary  level of velocity, and 
f3 is the responsiveness of velocity to the rate of inflation. This equation shows 
that because the deficit is financed by money creation there is inflation. But it 
also shows that the inflationary  impact of  a given deficit can differ widely, 
depending on the financial structure and the growth rate of output. 
IT  = (ag -  YMl - Pg);  1 > pg, 
The key points of  this relation are the following: 
The inflation  rate  is lower the  higher  the  growth  rate  of  output because 
when  output  grows strongly,  so does real  money  demand. Accordingly, 
there is room for some extra money to be issued without introducing the 
risk of inflation. 
Inflation is higher the larger the budget deficit. Moreover, as will be shown 
in  figure 4.1, this relation  is very  nonlinear.  As the government  tries to 
finance  a  larger  deficit,  the  required  rate  of  inflation  increases  steeply. 
Depending  on the particular  form of  the  money  demand  equation, there 
may  even  be  a maximum  deficit  that can be  financed  by  money.  Going 
beyond that range implies hyperinflation. 
The inflation rate also depends on the parameters of the velocity equation, 
a  and p. The higher the level of noninflationary  velocity (i.e., because of 
dollarization as we argue below), the higher the rate of inflation associated 
with  any given deficit.  The parameter  p,  which captures  the  reaction  of 
velocity to inflation, plays the same role. A high degree of responsiveness 
implies a larger rate of inflation. 
The  increase  in  inflation  brought  about  by  a  one  percentage  point 
increase in the deficit is given by the expression (a  + @)/(1  - bg). The 
higher  the  increase,  the  higher  are  the  inflation  and  budget  deficit  from 
which one starts. This highlights  the fact that inflationary  finance  exerts a 
very  powerful  impact  on  inflation  if  it  is  used  in  large  doses  or  in  an 
environment  where  a  high  level  of  velocity-and  a strong responsiveness 
of velocity  to inflation-leaves  little scope for an inflation tax. 
Figure 4.1 represents how inflation is determined.  Given the deficit ratio, 
say go, the corresponding inflation rate is no.  As the schedule IT  depends on 
the  parameters  of  the  velocity  equation,  we  can  immediately  ask  some 
questions. What happens if, at a point like E, a government authorizes or no 
longer impedes dollarization? Or what happens if the growth rate of income 
declines?  The  latter  question  is  particularly  important.  As  Melnick  and 
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Fig. 4.1  Budget deficits and inflation 
hence raises inflation.  This is shown as a shift of the TT schedule up and to 
the left to give T'T'. The new inflation equilibrium,  given the deficit ratio, is 
at point E'  where inflation has increased. 
The point of this exercise is that we must look not only at the deficit when 
asking how high is the inflation, but equally important are the determinants of 
money demand and output growth. Of course, without deficits there would be 
no inflation.  But how  much  inflation  there  is depends critically  on money 
demand and growth and also, as we will now show, on the tax structure. 
4.1.2  The Olivera-Tanzi Effect 
One of  the  striking effects of  inflation is the erosion of  the real value of 
taxation. The point is quite obvious: if there is any delay between accrual and 
payment of taxes, the inflation in the interim will mean that the real value of 
what is paid is lower the higher the rate of inflation.  With moderate inflation 
it makes no difference that 1987 taxes are paid in 1988. But when inflation is 
high, this effect wreaks havoc with the real value of tax collection. 
Keynes, commenting on the impact of inflation on the budget,  noted this 
point as did Bresciani-Turroni (1937) and Graham (1928). Harberger (19641, 
Olivera  (1967),  and  Tanzi  (1977,  1978) have recognized  this  effect  in  the 
specific context  of  Latin  American  inflation.  The empirical  importance  of 
this  effect,  which  we  will  refer  to  as the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect,  is  large 
whenever inflation is high and tax collection lags are long and when there is 
no provision  for tax indexation. 
We  can integrate into our model this dependence of the real value of tax 
collection on the rate of inflation by adding an equation for the determination 
of the real deficit ratio. 
(3)  g  =  IT) + ib + i*b*, 83  ArgentinafChapter 4 
where u is the noninterest budget deficit, which increases with the rate of 
inflation  as  a  result  of  the  Olivera-Tanzi  effect.  We  have  also  added  as 
components of the budget deficit the domestic and external interest payments 
on debt. The terms b and b* denote the ratios of domestic and foreign debt to 
GDP.  The  debt  terms  are  introduced to  make  explicit  the  possibility of 
shocks to the budget associated with debt service, with erosion of the real 
value of  domestic debt,  or with  a real depreciation, which raises the real 
value of  external debt in terms of  GDP.* 
In figure 4.2 this equation is shown as the schedule gg. This schedule is 
drawn for a given debt ratio and capitalization coefficient. It is upward sloping 
because of the Olivera-Tanzi effect: the higher the rate of inflation, the larger 
the deficit ratio. We  also give the TT schedule, which shows the dependence 
of  inflation on the financing requirement and on the given financial structure. 
The diagram brings out the interdependence of  the budget and inflation. 
4.1.3  External Shocks and Inflation 
Consider now  the working  of  this model.  Suppose, as was  the  case in 
Argentina, that the public sector has a large external debt when external debt 
shock occurs. Specifically, assume that prior to the disturbance, any existing 
external  debt  was  rolled  over  with  interest  fully  capitalized through  the 
automatic “new money.”  Suppose there is no domestic debt, and let 8 be the 
fraction  of  external  debt  service  which  is  automatically  financed  by 
capitalization, so that: 
(4)  g = u(7T)  + (1 - O)i*b* 
T 
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Initially the economy will be at a point like E in figure 4.2, with inflation 
depending  solely  on  the  domestic  deficit.  Now  suppose  external  creditors 
suspend voluntary lending so that the capitalization coefficient falls to zero, 
as  occurred  in  1982.  It  is  immediately  apparent  that  reduced  access  to 
automatic  capitalization  of  interest  payments  increases  the  portion of  the 
deficit that must be financed by money creation. Now the country has to earn 
the  resources  for external  finance,  or else finance  the  purchase  of  foreign 
exchange by money creation. The gg schedule shifts outward and to the right 
for two rea~ons.~  First, the government will issue more money to finance the 
purchase of  foreign  exchange for interest  payments  (assuming, of  course, 
that  there  are  no  expenditure  cuts  or  tax  increases).  Second,  there  will 
typically be a real depreciation in order to improve the external balance. 
The new equilibrium at point E‘ shows a sharply higher rate of  inflation. 
The increase in inflation is greater the larger the debt service shock and the 
real  depreciation,  but  it also depends on the responsiveness  of  velocity  to 
inflation  and  on  the  degree  to  which  higher  inflation  erodes  real  tax 
collection. The important point to recognize is that each of these factors will 
increase significantly the inflationary impact of  the debt shock. 
During  high  inflation  episodes  there  will  invariably  be  a  discussion 
between  two  schools of  thought.  The “balance  of  payments  school”  will 
argue that external  balance  problems  and the resulting  depreciation  of  the 
exchange  rate  are  the  primary  cause  of  the  deficit.  In  the  German 
hyperinflation  of  1923,  for  example,  this  school  considered  reparation 
payments  as the  reason  for  exchange  depreciation  and  the  resulting  high 
inflati~n.~  By  contrast, the  “quantity  theory  school”  will  point  to budget 
deficits financed by money creation as the reason for inflation. 
From figure 4.2 it is evident that the distinction between the two schools is 
much  less clear-cut than  the  labels suggest.  In fact, money is endogenous, 
and  an  external  shock is a very  plausible  source of  an inflationary  spiral. 
Passive money is the essential ingredient in reconciling  the quantity school 
and  the  balance  of  payments  doctrine.  Not  surprisingly,  suspension  of 
reparation payments in Germany and of debt service in Bolivia in 1985 were 
essential  steps  in  the  stabilization  of  inflation.  In  Argentina,  involuntary 
external debt service (after 1982) became an important source of  inflation in 
exactly the  manner  the  balance  of  payments  school emphasizes.  Terms of 
trade deterioration further aggravated the external debt shock by forcing real 
depreciation and hence an increase in the real value (in terms of GDP or the 
tax base) of  the existing external debt service. 
4.1.4  Endogenous Financial Innovation and Liberalization 
When an inflationary  process develops, we often observe an endogenous 
financial adaptation.  The interest that traditional depository institutions can 
pay  is typically  controlled.  There may  be an outright limitation on interest 85  ArgentinaiChapter 4 
rates, or else institutions may be required to hold reserves or government debt 
at controlled rates. These restrictions make institutions unable to compete in 
financial  markets  in  which  nominal  interest  rates  more  nearly  reflect  the 
ongoing inflation. New, unregulated financial institutions that offer depositors 
higher interest rates spring up and thus draw customers away from traditional 
depository institutions. In terms of the velocity equation, there is a fall in the 
ratio  of  conventional  money  to  GDP.  The  government  loses  part  of  its 
inflation  tax  base  and  hence  equilibrium  inflation  increases.  In  terms  of 
equation (2) above, we have an increase in the parameters a  and/or p. 
The government  may  aggravate  matters  if  it responds  to the  increasing 
inflation by  raising reserve  requirements or forcing holding  of  government 
debt  by  traditional  banks.  This merely  further restricts  the  ability  of  the 
banks  to  compete  and  accelerates  disintermediation.  Governments  often 
actively  (and  ignorantly)  promote  this  process,  most  obviously  under  the 
guise  of  financial  liberalization.  Since  inflation  is  a  tax  on  money  (or 
commercial  bank  noninterest-bearing  reserves),  financial  liberalization,  not 
surprisingly,  means that the public can avoid the tax on money. 
As a result of these incentives,  financial liberalization will be pressed  on 
the  government.  Velocity will  rise  and  so will  the inflation  rate  associated 
with the financing of a given deficit by money creation.  It is quite clear that 
from an  inflation  point  of  view  financial  repression,  not  liberalization,  is 
appropriate.  Financial  liberalization  requires  that  extra  tax  revenue  be 
available  to  avoid  the  inflationary  impact  of  a  reduction  in  the  captive 
inflation tax base. 
Governments  that  condone  dollarization,  likewise,  promote  inflation. 
Dollarization  is captured  in  equation  (2)  by  the coefficients  (Y  and  p. The 
shift from the domestic monetary base (Ml) into dollars reduces the base for 
the  inflation  tax  and  hence  must  increase  inflation.  Figure  4.3 shows  the 
behavior of the ratio of M1 to GDP over the past twenty-five years. Growth 
in  real  output  is  hardly  an  explanation  for  the  behavior  of  this  ratio,  as 
growth was very small over the period. The main explanation is the response 
of  real  money  demand  to  inflation  and  the  introduction  of  financial 
intermediaries  and of dollarization  in response  to the potential demand  for 
inflation hedges. 
It is tempting to try to fully explain inflation in terms of dollarization and 
new  financial  intermediaries  in  the  sense  that  countries  with  stronger 
dollarization  have  higher  inflation.  But  that  would  go  too  far  since 
dollarization is also a response to inflation. Our point is that a government 
which  experiences  some  inflation  and  makes  dollarization  easier  will 
experience even more inflation.  In terms of figure 4.4, dollarization  would 
shift the  TT schedule up  and to the left.  Accordingly,  the  rate of inflation 
rises for each level of the deficit. 
We  look next at the role of  contracts in the inflation process. 86  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
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Fig. 4.4  The effects of financial liberalization 
4.2  Contracts 
So far we have only  looked at the interaction of  financing requirements 
and  the  financial  structure.  We  were  able  to  do  so  by  assuming  full 
wage-price flexibility.  But that,  of course, is not realistic.  On the contrary, 
an essential feature of the inflation process is a melting of contract structure. 
As inflation accelerates, contracts shorten, and that shortening of contracts is 
itself a factor that causes inflation to accelerate. 87  ArgentindChapter 4 
4.2.1  The Pazos-Simonsen  Mechanism 
Institutional wage-setting mechanisms often rely on a fixed contract length, 
with wage adjustments occumng at specified intervals. The adjustments are 
based  on the  cumulated  increase  in  prices  since  the  last  adjustment.  For 
example,  earners  might  receive  full  compensation  for  past  actual  price 
increases  at regular  intervals,  say yearly.  Now  suppose  there  is  a  shift to 
six-month intervals.  Two interesting questions  arise. The first concerns the 
dynamics  of  shifting  to  shorter contracts.  What  is  the  threshold  for  the 
inflationary  erosion  of  wages  that  causes  the  shift,  and  what  makes  it 
economywide  rather  than  just  in  a  particular  firm?  The other interesting 
question is what happens  when the frequency  of  adjustment  increases  still 
further. This point has been developed particularly by Simonsen (1983) and 
Pazos (1972). It is of interest here because contract deterioration is one of the 
important  characteristics of  an accelerating  inflation  and because exchange 
depreciation often plays an important role in triggering the process. 
If  nominal  wages are adjusted only periodically,  the real wage follows a 
saw-toothed pattern. On each adjustment date, the nominal wage is increased 
by the inflation cumulated since the preceding adjustment, say by 50 percent. 
Until the next adjustment date, the real wage declines as the ongoing inflation 
erodes the purchasing power of the constant nominal payments. By the end of 
the adjustment interval, the real wage has declined below its period average. 
The higher the rate of inflation, moreover, the lower the average real wage, 
given the interval of adjustment. 
In a system of full, but lagged, indexation,  the real wage can be lowered 
only  by  moving  to  a  higher  rate  of  inflation.  Thus,  once  and  for  all, 
depreciation  of  the  currency  immediately  raises  the  rate  of  inflation  and 
erodes existing  contracts,  but the catch-up through  indexation ensures that 
inflation must be pushed to an even higher rate, so that there is always some 
group of  wage earners whose wages are still lagging the increasing rates of 
price  increases.  The  same  principle  applies  to  the  removal  of  subsidies 
established to correct the budget.  Measures  undertaken  to correct competi- 
tiveness or the budget can be effective only if they achieve a reduction in the 
real wage, but because of full indexation that reduction can take place only if 
inflation is allowed to run at a higher rate. This mechanism  often  sets the 
stage for inflation explosions. 
Consider  a  country  that  requires  adjustments  in  the  budget  and  in 
external  competitiveness.  Suppose that  the  government  lacks  the  political 
force  to  suspend  full  indexation,  so  that  the  removal  of  subsidies  or  a 
real  exchange  depreciation  will  speed  up  the  inflation  rate.  Workers  in 
the  middle  of  their  contracts,  for  example,  will  find  that  their  real 
wages  fall  below  what  they  consider  a  minimum  standard  of  living. 
They cannot borrow,  even in perfect  capital markets.  Hence they  will  call 
for a shorter interval between wage adjustments in order to recover the real 88  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
wage  losses  imposed  by  inflation.  They  will  ask for an  advance of  what 
they think is due.  If the economy  does shift from, say, six-month to three- 
month indexation intervals,  the inflation rate will simply d~uble.~  But once 
the  contract  structure  has  moved  to  a  three-month  scheme,  two  facts 
are  clear.  First,  it  is  exceptionally  unlikely  that  the  indexation  structure 
will  return  spontaneously  to  a  longer  interval,  even  if  shocks  are  favor- 
able. Second, there is nothing to make the three-month interval more stable 
than the six-month interval that was just abandoned.  New  shocks will  shift 
the economy  to even more frequent  adjustments  and  hence  to correspond- 
ingly  higher  rates  of  inflation.  At  this  stage, the  exchange rate  becomes 
critical. 
In  his  seminal  study  of  the  inflation  process  in  Latin  America,  Pazos 
(1972, 92-93)  has described the dynamics as follows: 
When the rate  of  inflation  approaches  the limit of  tolerance,  a growing 
number of trade unions ask for raises before their contracts become due. 
And  management  grants them.  These wage increases  give an  additional 
push  to inflation  and  bring  about  a further reduction  of  the  adjustment 
interval.  Probably  the  interval  is  initially  shortened  to  six  months, and 
then,  successively, to three months, one month, one week,  and one day. 
At  first the  readjustment  is based  on the  cost-of-living  index; but  since 
there is a delay of one or two months or more in the publication  of  this 
index, it  must  soon  be  replaced  by  another.  The best-known  and  more 
up-to-date of the possible indicators in Latin America is the quotation of a 
foreign currency, generally the U.S. dollar. 
This description of  the inflation process makes it clear that  the dramatic 
escalation  of  inflation,  seemingly  out  of  proportion  to  the  disturbances, 
arises from the endogeneity of the adjustment interval. This is not really due 
to the direct impact on inflation of corrective exchange rate or price policies. 
Rather,  it occurs because an increase in inflation-which  may be minor but 
highly visible, such as a 10 percent devaluation over and above a purchasing 
power parity  (PPP) rule, or a removal of bread  subsidies-is  the straw that 
breaks the camel’s back.  It  leads to an  increase  in  the frequency  of  wage 
adjustments, which brings on a much higher inflation rate. The endogeneity 
of  adjustment  intervals  is  the  mechanism  that  connects  small  inflation 
disturbances  with  a  shift  from  50  to  100 percent  inflation,  or  beyond  to 
hyperinflation  (see table 4.1). 
The exact  mode  of  the  shift  to  increased  frequency  of  adjustment  will 
differ from one experience to another: the government may cave in under the 
impact of a strike, business may find it easier to give an “advance”  on the 
real wage adjustment rather than risk labor unrest in the middle of a recovery 
or boom,  or a planning minister may seek the popularity that comes from a 
wage policy which appears to favor labor. One way or another, the frequency 
will increase, and once it increases in a large part of the economy, it cannot 
fail to become generalized.  It is interesting to note that there are no  models 89  ArgentindChapter 4 
to  explain  the  actual  process  of  shortening  for  the  indexation  period 
available. Cardoso and Dornbusch (1987) have drawn attention to this fact 
and  speculate  that  perhaps  Schelling’s  (1982,  chap.  3)  model  of  group 
choice might be applicable. 
We have left unanswered the very interesting issue of the exact model of 
socioeconomic  interaction  that  brings  about  contract  shortening.  Clearly 
inflation is the basic reason. But why are there discrete steps only: one year, 
six month, three month, one month, the dollar, and why does it require such 
large steps in inflation before the economy shifts to the next level? Perhaps 
the answers might come from the Schelling model, but it is certainly clear 
that this is a critically important research area for a better understanding of 
inflation dynamics. 
It  is  immediately  clear  from  the  Pazos-Simonsen  mechanism  that  the 
optimal  incomes  policy  designed  to  avoid  creating  the  context  for  an 
inflationary  explosion  is  one  that  monitors  above  all  the  frequency  of 
adjustments. An  entirely different view  emerges with  respect to exchange 
rate and budget policy. As long as full indexation remains, even seemingly 
small corrections are a dramatic threat to the stability of the inflation rate and 
hence may not be worth undertaking. 
4.3  Dynamics 
So far we have looked at the inflationary aspects of deficit finance and at the 
contracting process  separately.  The actual dynamics of  the economy, how- 
ever, emerge from the interaction of these processes. A stable equilibrium, as 
shown in figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4, may not actually exist. The dynamics of 
the  interaction  among  deficit  finance,  institutional  innovation  in  financial 
markets, dollarization, and shortening contracts may not lead us there, even 
if  a stable equilibrium does exist. 
A more appropriate view of the inflation process is that when inflation gets 
to be high, it can only go higher. Moderate inflation has some inertia because 
there are many institutions that do not give way at the slightest  sign of  an 
inflationary shock.  But  when  inflation rises  significantly  and permanently, 
institutions adapt. In doing so, they themselves feed the process of increasing 
inflation. Extreme inflation, in this view, stems from a radical melting of  all 
institutions: near abandonment of domestic money, meaning the government 
must inflate at infinite rates to get any seigniorage, and contracts of  short 
duration, namely dollar-based contracts. 
The most  striking  fact  is the  sharp  asymmetry  between  low  and  high 
inflation  experience.  At  moderate  rates  of  inflation  there  is  virtually  no 
response of institutional behavior: contracts remain annual even when there 
is 50 or 100 percent inflation, and people hold domestic money even though 
they lose in real terms. But institutional adaptation accelerates when inflation 
gets high. The institutional meltdown takes only a few months, as recorded 90  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
in  table  4.4.  The table  shows how  little  time  it  takes  to  move  from  15 
percent  per  month  to 50 percent  per month,  which  qualifies  for Cagan’s 
(1956) definition of hyperinflation. 
When interpreting the historical record of  inflation such as that shown in 
tables  4.1  and  4.4, it  is  common  to  assume  the  presence  of  adaptive 
inflationary  expectations,  as did  Cagan  (1956).  The  reason  is  that  there 
appears to be a significant sluggishness in the initial phases and a subsequent 
acceleration, which is suggestive of exactly such an expectations mechanism. 
Adaptive inflationary expectations are often the model device key to slowing 
the impact of  money on inflation. An alternative and perhaps more accurate 
model has a stronger focus on the dynamics of deterioration of contracts, both 
in the goods and labor markets, and on the inflationary adaptation of financial 
institutions.  The  dynamics  of  institutions-their  inertia  at  low  rates  of 
inflation and their gradual and eventually complete melting-seem  to offer a 
more suitable framework for the study of  high inflation. 
In  a  model  that  emphasizes  the  melting  of  institutions,  the  inflation 
process  is  quite  naturally  explosive,  and  there  is  also  an  accurate 
description  of  the  fact  that  events  play  themselves  out  in  shorter  and 
shorter  time  intervals.  As  Allais  (1966) has  argued,  the  economic  time 
interval shrinks along with contracts and maturities of  financial assets until, 
when the economy has converged to a spot market with dollar pricing, the 
budget or external balance deficit leads to hyperinflation.  Hyperinflation is 
Table 4.4  The Process of Hyperinflation (monthly rate of inflation) 
Month  Germany  Austria  Hungary  Poland  Greece 
1  17  15  35  I1  33 
2  2  7  23  16  6 
3  9  4  24  34  11 
4  43  1  24  12  34 
5  91  15  -1  32  14 
6  49  -  10  2  37  36 
7  97  32  15  26  47 
8  104  33  9  58  90 
9  28  64  58  58  35 
10  43  78  26  15  I45 
I1  I45  46  13  7  152 
12  -  13  43  54  6  90 
13  4  14  98  67  100 
14  43  3  62  63  158 
15  139  16  20  72  60 
16  205  41  6  38  305 
17  1,216  33  8  275  349 
18  4,126  92  25  148  1,909 
19  3,773  134  29  109  8,894 
20  35,879  82  79  70  85,507,000 
Source:  Pazos (1972). 
Nore: Germany,  April  1922-November  1923;  Austria,  February  1921  -September  1923;  Hungary,  July 
1922-Febmary  1924; Poland, June  1922-January  1924; Greece, April  1943-November  1945. 91  ArgentindChapter 5 
inevitable because the inflation tax, with sufficient financial adaptation,  can 
be almost entirely evaded and hence the budget deficit cannot be  financed. 
The  Olivera-Tanzi  effect,  the  shortening  of  contracts,  and  financial 
adaptation  all  react  in  a  perverse  way  (from  the  point  of  view  of 
stabilization)  in  that  they  widen  the  deficit  and accelerate  explosively  the 
inflation process. 
4.4  Concluding Remarks: Why Stabilization Is Difficult 
The preceding discussion has an immediate bearing on the fact that stabiliza- 
tion is difficult and, more often than not, takes more than one attempt to succeed. 
In  the  process  of  high  inflation  all  institutions  melt.  When  stabilization  is 
undertaken,  there  is  neither  immediate,  spontaneous  resumption  of  longer 
adjustment periods for wages and prices, nor an instant increase of real money 
demand to noninflationary levels. As a result, more sizable adjustments in the 
budget  are required and more dramatic measures  are necessary to create the 
confidence that stabilization will last.  Because the fiscal measures have to be 
extremely large,  they  are also extremely difficult and  hence often cannot be 
sustained. When they fail, inflation returns instantly at an exceptionally high level 
because institutional inertia has not recovered. 
We  will see in the next chapter how  incomes policy-freezing  exchange 
rates,  wages,  and prices-can  be an effective supplement  to the  inevitable 
budget cut. It makes up for institutional inertia and, to that extent,  gives a 
government  a better chance  to start stabilization.  But, as is clear from the 
experiences  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Peru,  failure  to correct  the  budget 
means that high inflation will soon return. The decline in the ratio of M1 to 
GDP that occurred in 1980-85,  shown in figure 4.3, was not fully reversed 
in the initial  stabilization.  As a result,  financing  even a moderate deficit is 
much more inflationary than it was prior to the experience of extremely high 
inflation.  This  hysteresis  effect  of  high  inflation  (similarly  apparent  in 
contracts,  pricing,  and  tax  collection)  sharply  reduces  the  chances  of 
stopping inflation with anything short of a dramatic budget cut. 
5  The Austral Plan 
In early 1985 Argentina moved to the very brink of economic disintegration. 
The rate of price increase accelerated by the month, reaching an annual rate 
of 6,000, and was still rising. At this stage the government made a decisive 
move: recognizing both the need for austerity measures and the political and 
economic obstacles to a stabilization that relied only on the demand side, the 